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LICENSE TO SELL: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
RETAIL MARIJUANA LICENSES
Gregory S. Toma*
States are increasingly legalizing and regulating recreational marijuana,
largely as a result of their citizens’ actions. The sale of recreational marijuana
is strictly regulated, but jurisprudence within the field is scarce. Among these
regulations, some states have imposed a durational residency requirement as
a prerequisite for a retail marijuana license. Such a requirement mirrors those
imposed on retail liquor licenses the Supreme Court recently struck down.
States have imposed durational residency requirements in many contexts
throughout history and, while some are upheld, many are struck down as
unconstitutional impingements on the right to travel. However, courts also use
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate such requirements, as
seen in the recent case Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas.
This Note explores the constitutionality of durational residency requirements
for retail marijuana licenses under the right to travel line of cases and the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and ultimately concludes that such
requirements should be abolished.
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INTRODUCTION
“We’re the ones who fought for this . . . . Allowing people from outside
the state is not benefitting Ohio or Ohioans or our unemployment.”1 The
notion that one reaps what one sows has a long history and is prevalent
in U.S. culture.2 The case is no different with regard to legalizing

1. Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Medical Marijuana Entrepreneurs Want Residency
Requirement for Business Licenses, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 11, 2019) (quoting Kelly
Mottola,
owner
of
Hydro
Innovations
in
Hiliard,
Ohio),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2017/03/ohio_medical_marijuana_entrepr.html
[https://perma.cc/PC47-N8KR].
2. See Galatians 6:7. A Pew Research Center survey found that nearly 70% of
Americans describe the “typical American” as “selfish.” Janell Ross, Americans Are
Patriotic, Honest, Lazy and Selfish, According to Americans, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015,
8:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/12/americans-arent-terribly-i
mpressed-with-americans/ [https://perma.cc/QW5Y-44MB].
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marijuana;3 the citizens who pushed for legalization want to reap the
benefits themselves.4
Despite the continued federal prohibition, in 2012, Colorado and
Washington became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana
use.5 Today, nine other states and the District of Columbia have joined
Colorado and Washington in legalizing recreational marijuana.6 One way
these states prevent outsiders from free riding off the work of their citizens
is by imposing durational residency requirements on retail marijuana
licenses.7
Throughout history, states have imposed durational residency
requirements, and courts have grappled with their constitutionality.8
Recently, the Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational
residency requirement for seeking a retail liquor license under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.9 However, there are many
differences between alcohol and recreational marijuana, such as the fact
that state regulation of the former is explicitly authorized by the

3. “Marijuana” is a popular name for a drug derived from the Cannabis sativa plant.
See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, WHAT IS MARIJUANA? (2020),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/what-marijuana
[https://perma.cc/2MJX-TTKB]. Some statutes use the terms “marihuana” or
“cannabis,” and there are many other popular names. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2018). This
Note uses the term “marijuana” throughout. For an interesting examination of the history
and meaning of these terms, see Jon Gettman, Marijuana vs. Cannabis: Pot-Related Terms
to Use and Words We Should Lose, HIGH TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://hightimes.com/culture/marijuana-vs-cannabis-pot-related-terms-to-use-and-word
s-we-should-lose/ [https://perma.cc/BL2H-57WU].
4. See, e.g., Penelope Overton, First Pot-Business Licenses Would Go to Maine
Residents of at Least 4 Years, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/04/03/first-pot-business-licenses-would-go-to-maine-r
esidents-of-at-least-4-years/ [https://perma.cc/7LJ7-MMLA/]; Borchardt, supra note 1.
5. See Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: Colorado Legalizes Marijuana for
Recreational
Use,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
20,
2012),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/amendment-64-passes-in-co_n_2079899.ht
ml?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004 [https://perma.cc/K9LS-YE54]; Jonathan Martin,
Voters Approve I-502 Legalizing Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:05 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/voters-approve-i-502-legalizing-marijuana/
[https://perma.cc/4K2N-WRLR].
6. Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (June 25, 2019),
https://marijuana.procon.org/legal-recreational-marijuana-states-and-dc/
[https://perma.cc/SYC3-3TYY].
7. See BARBARA BROHL & JACK FINLAW, STATE OF COLO., TASK FORCE REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
AMENDMENT
64,
at
33
(2013),
THE
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/A64TaskForceFinalReport%5B1%5
D_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX3A-WLA2].
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
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Constitution while the latter is subject to federal prohibition.10 Therefore,
the merits of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to durational
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are questionable.11
In light of the Court’s recent decision and recreational marijuana use’s
growing legalization12 at the state level, the constitutionality of
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses warrants
examination.
Part I of this Note provides a general background on durational
residency requirements and how courts have approached them. Part I
also examines the recent legalization of marijuana for recreational use by
several states and how those states regulate their marijuana industries.
Part II examines the different arguments for and against the
constitutionality of durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses. Finally, Part III concludes that these durational
residency requirements should be abolished because they impinge on the
right to travel and violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
I. THE HISTORY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND
MARIJUANA
While the legalization of recreational marijuana usage is a recent
development,13 the existence of state-imposed durational residency
requirements can be traced back to before the Constitutional
Convention.14 To understand how courts will treat durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses, it is first necessary to examine
how they have treated durational residency requirements in other
contexts.
Durational residency requirements “condition certain
governmental benefits and privileges upon residence within a state or
locality for a specified period of time.”15 People who have been in the
state for the required amount of time qualify to receive the conditioned

10. See infra Sections I.B, II.C.
11. See infra Sections I.B, II.C.
12. This Note refers to non-medical marijuana use as “recreational marijuana use”
although some sources, including some state statutes, use the term “adult-use marijuana.”
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-B, § 202 (2018); Michael Cooper, Safe Streets Alliance &
the Tenth Amendment: Intrastate Cannabis Markets, Interstate Authority & Political
Consequences, 18 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 195, 196 (2018).
13. See Ferner, supra note 5 (explaining that, in 2012, Colorado and Washington
became the first states to end marijuana prohibition).
14. Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements
from the Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611, 614–16 (2016) (“Early state
constitutions were replete with durational residency requirements . . . for voting . . . .”).
15. Michael A. Lee, Durational Residence Requirements for Public Employment, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 386, 386 (1979).
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benefit and those who have not do not.16 States have imposed durational
residency requirements in an array of contexts, and the Supreme Court
has applied different standards of review to determine their
constitutionality.17
This Part discusses several types of durational residency requirements
and the growing trend of states legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
First, Section I.A examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
state-imposed durational residency requirements. Second, Section I.B
examines state-imposed durational residency requirements in the context
of retail liquor licenses. Finally, Section I.C discusses the recent
legalization of recreational marijuana use by several states.
A. The Right to Travel: Supreme Court Jurisprudence on State-Imposed
Durational Residency Requirements
The Supreme Court has treated state-imposed durational residency
requirements differently depending on the requirement’s context. Over
time, the Court has applied a variety of rationales to either uphold or
strike down durational residency requirements. The fundamental right
to travel is a product of one of these rationales.
In the 1960s, two states and the District of Columbia enacted statutes
that denied public assistance to people who were not residents for a
specified period.18 The Supreme Court struck down the statutes in
Shapiro v. Thompson.19 The Court held that the statutes at issue created
“two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other,”
other than their length of residency, and that this denied new residents
“equal protection of the laws” afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.20
The Court explained that the requirements “touch[] on the fundamental
right of interstate movement.”21
This “fundamental right of interstate movement” is commonly known
as the right to travel.22 The Court “explicitly specified that it had ‘no

16. Durational
Residency
Requirements.,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/durational-resi
dency-requirements#fn2102amd14 [https://perma.cc/HCU8-GF3W] (last visited July 21,
2020).
17. See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
18. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2c (1967) (repealed 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203
(1967) (repealed 1969); 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 432(6) (1968) (repealed 1969); see also David
A. Donahue, Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirements for Welfare Benefits,
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 451, 453 n.11 (1998) (collecting statutes).
19. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
20. Id. at 627.
21. Id. at 638.
22. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 455.
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occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel . . . to a particular
constitutional provision.’”23 According to the Court, it was enough that
it had recognized the right to travel as a fundamental right in the past.24
Shapiro was the first time the Court explicitly held that any
impingement on a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny.25
Specifically referring to the right to travel, the Shapiro Court explained
that under the strict scrutiny standard, “any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”26
Finding that the interests the states asserted were either constitutionally
impermissible27 or not compelling enough28 to withstand strict scrutiny,
the Court struck down the statutes.29 The Court subsequently used the
Shapiro strict scrutiny framework as the basis of its analysis of durational
residency requirements in other contexts that touched on the right to
travel, including voting restrictions.30
The Court broadened its right to travel jurisprudence in Dunn v.
Blumstein.31 There, the Court struck down Tennessee’s one-year
durational residency requirement for voting in state elections32 as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
The Court applied strict scrutiny because the durational residency

23. Id. (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630).
24. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630–31.
25. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282
(2007). Precursors to the modern strict scrutiny test existed before Shapiro, but they
varied in form and were not clearly defined. See id. at 1284.
26. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
27. Id. at 631.
28. The Court rejected the states’ argument that durational residency requirements
are justified because they “(1) facilitate[] the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provide[]
an objective test of residency; (3) minimize[] the opportunity for recipients fraudulently
to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourage[] early entry of
new residents into the labor force.” Id. at 634.
29. Id. at 618.
30. These contexts also include access to medical care and boat mooring rights. See
Lawrence J. Conlan, Durational Residency Requirement for In-State Tuition: Searching for
Access to Affordable Higher Learning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 n.46 (2002).
31. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
32. States manipulated durational residency requirements for voting to either
encourage or discourage migrants from settling in the state. See Mazo, supra note 14, at
626–27. When a state wanted to encourage newcomers, it would shorten the time required
to satisfy the durational residency requirement for voting. See id. When a state wanted to
curb migration, it would lengthen the durational residency requirement. See id.
33. At issue were provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and parts of the Tennessee
Code that, together, prevented citizens from registering to vote until they were Tennessee
residents for one year. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 332 n.1.
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requirement impinged on the fundamental right to vote34 and the
fundamental right to travel.35 In striking down the durational residency
requirement, the Court found that it was “neither narrowly tailored to
[the state’s] interests, nor necessary to further compelling state
interests.”36 Tennessee argued that the durational residency requirement
at issue did not impinge on the right to travel because it was unlikely to
actually deter travel.37 Unconvinced, the Court held that “durational
residency requirements constitute[] penalties on the right to travel
whether or not the statute in question actually deter[s] interstate
travel.”38 Thus, the durational residency requirements only needed to be
capable of deterring but did not have to actually deter travel.39
The Supreme Court again struck down a state-imposed durational
residency requirement in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.40 This
case involved an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency
requirement on free, non-emergency medical care.41 Applying the Shapiro
framework, the Court held that the durational residency requirement
impinged on the fundamental right to travel42 by creating “an ‘invidious
classification’ which deprived newcomers to the state of ‘the basic
necessities of life.’”43 The Court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny and
held that the durational residency requirements at issue violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.44

34. Id. at 334–35.
35. Id. at 338 (“[T]he durational residence requirement directly impinges on the
exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel.”).
36. Donahue, supra note 18, at 456. Tennessee put forth two interests the durational
residency requirement purportedly served: (1) ensuring the purity of the ballot box and
(2) ensuring that those who vote are knowledgeable. The Court was not convinced. See
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345.
37. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 457.
38. Id. The Court rejected Tennessee’s attempt to distinguish Shapiro. See Dunn, 405
U.S. at 339–40 (“Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually
deterred travel. Nor have other ‘right to travel’ cases in this Court always relied on the
presence of actual deterrence.”).
39. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 339–40; Donahue, supra note 18, at 457.
40. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
41. The statute required individuals live in Arizona for at least one year before
qualifying to receive free, non-emergency medical care. See id. at 251.
42. Id. at 261–62 (“The State of Arizona’s durational residence requirement for free
medical care penalizes indigents for exercising their right to migrate to and settle in that
State.”).
43. Donahue, supra note 18, at 457 (quoting Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269). The Court
held that medical care is “a basic necessity of life,” similar to welfare benefits, which
cannot be disturbed. See Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259; Bryce Nixon, “Rational Basis with
a Bite”: A Retreat from the Constitutional Right to Travel, 18 L. & INEQ. 209, 217–18 (2000).
44. Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 250.
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Shapiro and its progeny establish that “strict scrutiny applies to any
classification which serves to penalize” the right to travel.45 However,
the Court has indicated that not all durational residency requirements are
per se unconstitutional.46
Sosna v. Iowa47 was the first case where the Supreme Court upheld a
The durational residency
durational residency requirement.48
requirement at issue in this case limited access to divorce.49 However, the
Court did not apply the Shapiro framework here.50 Writing for the
majority, Justice William Rehnquist distinguished Sosna based on the
fact that the durational residency requirement at issue could be “justified
on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative
convenience.”51 The Court found that the consequences of divorce — to
both spouses’ marital status, property rights, and custody and support
obligations — are significant enough to permit states to require parties to
have a “modicum of attachment to the State.”52 Without specifying
which standard of review it applied, the Court simply concluded that the
durational residency requirement for divorce was based on reasonable
state interests,53 and so was constitutional.54

45. Donahue, supra note 18, at 458.
46. See Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 256 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969)).
47. 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding Iowa’s one-year durational residency requirement
for seeking a divorce in the state).
48. Nixon, supra note 43, at 218.
49. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 395. At the time of the decision, 48 states imposed a durational
residency requirement for divorce actions. See id. at 404–05. A one-year requirement such
as Iowa’s was the most common length states mandated. See id. at 405. Louisiana and
Washington were the two states without any such requirement. See id. at 405 n.15.
50. See id. at 406–09; Thomas I. Sheridan, III, Case Notes, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 857,
867 (1975) (“Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Sosna did not apply the [Shapiro] analysis.”).
51. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406 (“What [Shapiro and its progeny] had in common was that
the durational residency requirements they struck down were justified on the basis of
budgetary or recordkeeping considerations which were held insufficient to outweigh the
constitutional claims of the individuals.”). The Court went on to say that the case at bar
“requires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in
Shapiro [and its progeny].” Id. at 409; see also Nixon, supra note 43, at 218.
52. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406–09. The Court accepted Iowa’s argument that the
durational residency requirement was necessary to protect the state interests in avoiding
becoming a “divorce mill” and avoiding collateral attack from other states. See id. at 407.
53. This is not to say the Court applied a rational basis test. See Sheridan, supra note
50, at 870 (“[T]he closest the Court came to applying a usable standard was when it twice
used, in a causal manner, the word ‘reasonably.’”) (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 561).
54. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 410; Nixon, supra note 43, at 218. Some criticize Sosna as
an example of ad hoc balancing. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 461.
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It may be possible to reconcile Sosna with the Shapiro framework.55
The Sosna Court distinguished durational residency requirements for
divorce from those at issue in the Shapiro line of cases based on the
permanency of the restriction.56 The durational residency requirement
challenged in Sosna temporarily restricted the right to file for a divorce,
but that right was fully restored once the durational residency
requirement was met.57 In the Shapiro line of cases, “the benefits or rights
forgone during the period of restriction were permanently lost.”58 In
other words, because welfare payments are ongoing, one will never obtain
their full benefit if the state requires a waiting period before administering
payments. The benefit of filing for a divorce, however, can be fully
experienced once obtained, even if delayed by the state.59 This nuance
left lower courts with little guidance on how to determine the proper level
of scrutiny for durational residency requirement cases, especially because
the Court did not specify a standard in its decision but twice used the word
“reasonably.”60
The Court unsuccessfully attempted to provide some clarification in
Saenz v. Roe.61 In 1992, California imposed a durational residency
requirement for receiving welfare benefits.62 In striking down the
requirement, the Court declined to follow the Shapiro framework despite
the similarities between the durational residency requirements at issue in

55. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 461.
56. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406 (“Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from
obtaining some part of what she sought, as was the case with the welfare recipients in
Shapiro, the voters in Dunn, or the indigent patient in Maricopa County.”).
57. See id. at 406–07.
58. Donahue, supra note 18, at 461–62; see also Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406.
59. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406; Donahue, supra note 18, at 461–62; Sheridan, supra
note 50, at 870.
60. See Nixon, supra note 43, at 222–25 (explaining that some courts have applied
rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny, while others follow the Shapiro strict
scrutiny framework).
61. 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting
Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of Saenz v. Roe, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 347
(2000) (explaining that the Court failed to seize the opportunity to clarify its murky right
to travel jurisprudence); Christopher S. Maynard, Note, Nine-Headed Caesar: The
Supreme Court’s Thumbs-Up Approach to the Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
297, 311 (2000) (“[T]he Court changed everything in Saenz v. Roe by completely altering
its right-to-travel analysis.”).
62. The statute at issue limited the amount of welfare benefits for new residents to an
amount equal to the maximum they received in their prior state of residence. New
residents could not receive full welfare benefits from California until they were residents
of the state for one year. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
11450.03 (West 1999), invalidated by Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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both cases.63 Remarkably, the Court based its decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause instead.64
California argued that the durational residency requirement at issue
was enacted purely for fiscal purposes.65 Although the Court conceded
that the state had a “legitimate interest in saving money,” it rejected such
a basis to justify discrimination amongst citizens.66 The Court identified
three components of the right to travel67 and focused on the third68 — the
right “of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities
enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.”69 That is to say, the right
to be treated like a citizen of a state where one permanently moves to.70
The Court explained that the appropriate standard of review for judging
a state law or regulation that discriminates between citizens based on
their length of residency “may be more categorical than that articulated
in Shapiro, but it is surely no less strict.”71 The Court held that “the
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty” regardless of the actual
effect on the right to travel — the right to travel “embraces [a] citizen’s

63. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492. Note, however, that the requirement here is
distinguishable from Shapiro’s because it did not completely deny benefits during the
waiting period. See also Maynard, supra note 61, at 311 (the Court did not find this
distinction dispositive).
64. See generally Saenz, 526 U.S. 489. This was only the second time the Court invoked
the Privileges or Immunities Clause since the Slaughter-House Cases. See Conlan, supra
note 30, at 1404–05. This was done in an effort to secure “a more stable footing on which
to base the right to travel.” Id. at 1405.
65. See Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel,
and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 123 (2001) (“California tried to distinguish Shapiro on the basis
that no one would be denied welfare benefits . . . but that some applicants would merely
receive reduced benefits during their first year of residency.”). The statute at issue would
“save the State approximately $10.9 million a year.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506.
66. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507. The Court explained that “[t]he question is not whether
such saving is a legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the
discriminatory means it has chosen.” Id. at 506. Ultimately, the Court answered that
question in the negative. See id. at 507.
67. These include (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave other states,
(2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor when in another state, and (3) the right to
be treated as a citizen of the state to which one permanently moves. See id. at 500. For a
discussion on the Court’s analysis of the origin of each component, see Nicole I. Hyland,
Note, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage Is Left on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187, 223 (2001).
68. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (“What is at issue . . . is this third aspect of the right to
travel . . . .”); Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz
v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 304 (1999); Maher, supra
note 65, at 124.
69. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
70. See Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406.
71. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504 (citation omitted).
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right to be treated equally in her new State of residence” — and struck
down the law.72
Narrowing its holding, the Court distinguished welfare benefits from
other benefits that could be subject to durational residency requirements,
“such as divorce or . . . college education.”73 Instead of focusing on the
temporal characteristics among the benefits, the Court focused on the
“portability” of the benefits.74 The Court emphasized that there is no
danger that welfare benefits could be received in one state then taken
away to another state.75 This portability distinction allowed the Court to
strike down the durational residency requirement at issue while
preserving its holdings in cases that upheld durational residency
requirements in other contexts, such as divorce in Sosna.76
Dissenting, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for
abandoning Shapiro and its progeny,77 although the majority did not
explicitly do so.78 The Chief Justice argued the Court should have upheld
the durational residency requirement as a “good-faith residency
requirement.”79
Post-Saenz, the constitutional basis for the right to travel is still
unclear because of the plethora of varied explanations the Court
provided.80 Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the three

72. Id. at 505; see also Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406. The Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause “does not allow for degrees of citizenship
based on length of residence.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506. For an argument that no durational
residency requirement can persist as a result of this holding, see Maher, supra note 65, at
133–34.
73. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. “By expressly distinguishing college education, Justice
Stevens may have quietly suffocated any hope that durational residency requirements for
in-state tuition might be declared unconstitutional under a new Privileges or Immunities
analysis.” Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406.
74. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 520; Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406.
75. Welfare benefits are unlike a divorce or a college education, which the Court
indicates durational residency requirement may be permissible. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505;
Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406.
76. The “readily portable” distinction was heavily criticized by the dissent. See
Conlan, supra note 30, at 1406; see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511–12 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
77. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 515.
78. See Tim Donaldson, A Teasing Illusion? Homelessness and the Right to Interstate
Travel, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 415 (2017).
79. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511.
80. See Maynard, supra note 61, at 313. Courts and scholars have identified at least
ten sources for the right. See id. at 314. Justice William Douglas exemplified the confusion
by tracing the right to travel to
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the penumbra of the First Amendment,
and, as a matter of inference, from a combination of the Comity Clause, the

1450

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

components of the right to travel outlined in Saenz.81 Some believe that
the Saenz holding prevents states from imposing any durational residency
requirement in any context.82 However, other scholars believe Saenz was
simply meant to clarify a more explicit constitutional source for the
fundamental right to travel and is unlikely to change the Supreme Court’s
right to travel jurisprudence significantly.83
The “categorical
reformulation of the right to travel” simply confines the rationale of prior
cases to the newly identified right to travel components.84 Therefore, “the
appropriate standard” remains “no less strict” than the strict scrutiny
standard articulated in Shapiro.85
B. Under the Influence: The Commerce Clause’s Effect on Alcohol
Regulation
Public discourse often involves comparing marijuana and alcohol, and
discussing how the former can be regulated similarly to the later.86 For
example, Amendment 64 of the Colorado Constitution — which legalized
recreational marijuana usage — promised to establish a regulatory
scheme for marijuana that would emulate the existing regulatory scheme
for alcohol.87 However, regulating marijuana is proving to be more

Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and
from the very nature of the Federal Union.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. See id. at 313.
82. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 515–16; Maher, supra note 65, at 133–34.
83. See, e.g., Conlan, supra note 30, at 1405–07; Ellis & Miller, supra note 61, at 348
(“It is difficult to believe that the Court would invalidate all durational residency
requirements . . . .”).
84. See Donaldson, supra note 78, at 415.
85. Hyland, supra note 67, at 223 (quoting Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504).
86. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Developing Public Health Regulations for
Marijuana: Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1021 (2014)
(“Our goal is . . . to help policymakers understand . . . some lessons learned from research
on public health approaches to regulating alcohol . . . .”); Renee Jacques, This Is Why
Marijuana Should Be Legal Everywhere, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/marijuana-legalization_n_4151423
[https://perma.cc/VQ64-U78D] (comparing the harms marijuana poses to those alcohol
poses).
87. The amendment promised to regulate marijuana like alcohol by (1) setting a
minimum age of 21 years to purchase marijuana, (2) requiring proof of age before sale, (3)
criminalizing driving under the influence of marijuana, and (4) mandating labeling
requirements. The amendment also provided that marijuana would be “taxed in a manner
similar to alcohol.” Angela Macdonald, Why Marijuana Is Not Regulated like Alcohol in
Colorado: A Warning for States Seeking to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 2015 UTAH
ONLAW 1, 1–2 (2015).
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difficult in practice than regulating alcohol.88 Nonetheless, marijuana
and alcohol regulations are similar in that they sometimes include
durational residency requirements for retail licenses. This Section
examines durational residency requirements’ roles in state regulation of
alcohol. To do so first requires an examination of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
i. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants Congress the explicit
power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes.”89 Although this is a positive grant of
power to Congress,90 Congress has, historically, not exercised regulation
over every area of commerce.91 Accordingly, Congress’ inaction allows
states room to devise their own regulations.92 The Supreme Court has
long held that the Commerce Clause also prevents states from adopting
laws and regulations that “unduly restrict interstate commerce,” even in
areas that Congress has left open.93 “‘This negative aspect of the
Commerce Clause’ prevents the States from adopting protectionist
measures and thus preserves a national market for goods and services.”94
This “negative aspect” is known as the dormant Commerce Clause.95 The

88. See generally id. (examining how recreational marijuana regulations and taxes
differ from alcohol regulations and taxes).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 (2019).
91. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 36 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987).
92. See id.
93. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459. “It is now well established . . . that the Clause itself
is ‘a limitation upon state power even without congressional implementation.’” Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1976)).
94. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273 (1988)).
95. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570. Chief Justice John Marshall first refers
to this dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824)
(“The [Commerce Clause] . . . convey[s] power which . . . must be placed in the hands of
agents, or lie dormant.”) (emphasis added); see also Sean Carey, Post-Davis Conduit Bonds:
At the Intersection of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Municipal Debt, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 121, 138 n.151 (2009).
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is well established,96 and courts have
used it to invalidate many state regulations.97
For example, the Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to strike down an Iowa statute that prohibited the use of certain
large trucks within the state.98 The Court expressed its reluctance to
invalidate “regulations that touch upon safety — especially highway
safety” because such regulations are of “matters traditionally of local
concern.”99 However, the state’s regulatory concern could not outweigh
the statute’s substantial interference with interstate commerce.100
Therefore, the statute was an invalid burden on interstate commerce.101
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accepted the notion of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine in general.102 However, he heavily criticized
the Court’s application of the doctrine to the case at bar.103 His criticism
was largely because of the local nature of highway regulations and the
fact that Congress has considered regulating truck lengths in the past but
decided to leave it to the states.104 Both the plurality and the dissent
agreed on the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but,

96. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 326 n.1 (1989). This is not to say that the doctrine is without critics. See, e.g., Tyler
Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); Redish & Nugent, supra
note 91, at 573–74 (arguing that there is no textual basis for the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and that it undermines the balance of power between the states and federal
government the Constitution’s text provides).
97. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 574–75.
98. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678–79. “Unlike all other States in the West and
Midwest, . . . Iowa generally prohibits the use of 65-foot doubles within its borders.” Id.
at 665. For an illustration of doubles compared to singles, see Raymond Motor Transp. v.
Rice, 417 F. Supp. 1352, 1363 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
99. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
100. See id. at 670–71. Iowa’s regulatory concern was highway safety and “keeping
trucks out of Iowa.” Id. at 677–78.
101. See id. at 671 (“[T]he Iowa truck-length limitations unconstitutionally burden
interstate commerce.”).
102. See id. at 689 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have read the Commerce Clause
as imposing some limitations on the States as well, even in the absence of any action by
Congress.”).
103. See generally id. Justice Rehnquist also disagrees on what factors courts may
consider when weighing a state’s regulatory concern against a regulation’s interference
with interstate commerce. Id. at 692 n.4 (“I do not agree . . . that only those safety
benefits somehow articulated by the legislature as the motivation for the challenged
statute can be considered in supporting the state law.”).
104. Id. at 691 n.3 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1111, at 10 (1974) (“The Committee believes
that truck lengths should remain, as they have been, a matter for State decision.”)).
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as Justice Rehnquist laments, “the jurisprudence of the ‘negative side’ of
the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused.”105
ii. Alcohol Regulation
By statutorily granting states the power to regulate a specific area,
Congress can overrule a prior dormant Commerce Clause invalidation of
state regulation in that area.106 However, the states’ power to regulate
alcohol stems from more than a mere statutory grant of power.107 The
Constitution itself grants states such power.108
The Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment109
and authorizes states to regulate alcohol how they see fit.110 Every state
has since repealed prohibition and implemented a regulatory scheme.111
States enjoy “virtually complete control over” the way they regulate
alcohol within their borders,112 and many states have imposed durational
residency requirements as a prerequisite for applying for a retail liquor

105. See id. at 706. The confusion persists to this day. Compare Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 (2019) (applying the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine), with id. at 2478 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this area . . . we should
not be in the business of imposing our own judge-made ‘dormant Commerce Clause’
limitations on state powers.”).
106. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570.
107. This is not to say that Congress has not statutorily granted states the power to
regulate alcohol. In fact, Congress has done so on more than one occasion. See The
Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2018) (prohibiting the transportation of alcohol from
one state to another in any manner that violates the receiving state’s laws); The Wilson
Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2018) (“[I]ntoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any
State . . . shall upon arrival in such State . . . be subject to the operation and effect of the
laws of such State . . . in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been
produced in such state.”).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
109. See id. amend. XXI § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.”).
110. See id. amend. XXI § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State . . . for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.”).
111. The majority of states have established a “three-tier system” which requires
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers be separately licensed, and prohibits uniform
ownership between tiers. See Roni A. Elias, Three Cheers for Three Tiers: Why the
Three-Tier System Maintains Its Legal Validity and Social Benefits After Granholm, 14
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 209, 211–13 (2016). 17 states operate a “control model”
whereby the state government controls the sale of alcohol at the wholesale level. See
Control State Directory and Info, NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N,
https://www.nabca.org/control-state-directory-and-info [https://perma.cc/R45T-EE7R]
(last visited July 31, 2020). Thirteen of these jurisdictions also maintain governmental
control over retail sales. See id.
112. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488 (2005) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
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license.113 Recently, the Supreme Court struck down this type of
durational residency requirement in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers
Ass’n v. Thomas,114 notwithstanding the “virtually complete control”
over alcohol regulation the Twenty-First Amendment granted to the
states.115
Tennessee required prospective liquor retailers to be Tennessee
residents for two years before applying for a retail liquor license.116 Such
a requirement is discriminatory on its face and, under the dormant
Commerce Clause,117 “could not be sustained if it applied across the board
to all those seeking to operate any retail business in the State.”118
However, the Court recognized that alcohol is a unique commodity; the
power to regulate it is specifically granted to the states by the
Constitution.119 Consequently, the Twenty-First Amendment may save
an otherwise discriminatory requirement.120 The Court held that
Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement was protectionist
in effect and could not be “justified as a public health or safety measure
or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.”121 Therefore, the
Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, unable to be saved by the
Twenty-First Amendment.122 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
now limits the “virtually complete control over” alcohol regulation states
previously enjoyed, and states cannot impose durational residency
requirements on prospective retail liquor licensees.123 Despite the lack of
any comparable grant of power, states impose similar durational

113. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2478 n.2
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (collecting statutes).
114. See id. at 2476.
115. See id. (holding unconstitutional Tennessee’s two-year durational residency
requirement for seeking a liquor license).
116. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204 (2018), invalidated by Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2449.
117. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2477–84 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Court did not
discuss the right to travel. See generally id.
118. Id. at 2474 (“Tennessee’s 2-year durational-residency requirement plainly favors
Tennesseans over nonresidents.”).
119. See id.
120. See id. at 2483 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2474 (“The provision at issue here expressly discriminates against
nonresidents and has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety.”).
122. See id. at 2476.
123. See generally Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2476; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488
(2005) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
110 (1980)).
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residency requirements on persons seeking to apply for retail marijuana
licenses.124
C. Recreational Marijuana’s Recent Legalization by States: The
Prevalence of Durational Residency Requirements
The federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) criminalizes the
possession of marijuana for any purpose.125 Nevertheless, 33 states have
established medical marijuana programs,126 and today, recreational
marijuana use has been legalized in 11 states and the District of
Columbia.127 The first of the states, Colorado and Washington, legalized
recreational marijuana in 2012,128 and both states have since established
regulatory authorities to oversee their marijuana industries.129
Durational residency requirements for prospective marijuana retailers
were among the laws and regulations first promulgated by both states.130
Other states131 have also imposed durational residency requirements on

124. See infra Section I.C.
125. See John G. Sprankling, Owning Marijuana, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
1, 13–14 (2019). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2018).
126. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 10,
2020),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SSR2-BBBP].
127. See Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, supra note 6.
128. See Ferner, supra note 5; Martin, supra note 5.
129. The Marijuana Enforcement Division of Colorado’s Department of Revenue
regulates the Colorado marijuana industry. See generally Marijuana Enforcement, COLO.
DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement
[https://perma.cc/7LUZ-8PRK] (last visited July 31, 2020). Washington tasked its
already established Liquor Control Board with regulating marijuana. See Press Release,
Washington State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., Liquor Control Board Statement Following
Passage
of
Initiative
502
(Nov.
7,
2012),
https://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/liquor-control-board-statement-following-passage-initiat
ive-502 [https://perma.cc/EM5F-3PHY].
130. Colorado prohibited anyone not a resident of the state for at least two years from
seeking a retail marijuana license. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.3-307(1)(m) (2010)
(repealed 2018). Washington imposes a six-month durational residency requirement. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331(1)(b)(ii) (2019) (“No license of any kind may be issued
to . . . [a] person . . . who has not lawfully resided in the state for at least six months prior
to applying to receive a license . . . .”).
131. Local jurisdictions have also imposed durational residency requirements on retail
marijuana licenses. For example, Hollister, California requires 75% of the applicants and
managers or a proposed marijuana dispensary to be residents of the state for at least three
years prior to applying for a license. See Hollister Cannabis Facilities Permit Application
and Information, CITY HOLLISTER CAL., http://hollister.ca.gov/business/medical-cannabis/
[https://perma.cc/22BV-UUWE] (last visited July 31, 2020).
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retail marijuana licenses — including California,132 Maine,133 Michigan,134
and Oregon.135 Presently, Alaska has a residency requirement, but it is
not a durational residency requirement per se.136 Illinois does not have
an explicit durational residency requirement but favors residents of five
years when awarding licenses.137 Only two states138 have never imposed
a durational residency requirement for retail marijuana licenses.139

132. Proposition 64 legalized recreational marijuana in California and included a de
facto three-year durational residency requirement for retail licensees that has since been
repealed. The statute prohibited issuance of a license “to any person that cannot
demonstrate continuous California residency from or before January 1, 2015.” Because
licenses were set to be issued in 2018, this statute effectively created a three-year
durational residency requirement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26054.1 (Deering 2016)
(repealed 2017).
133. To seek a retail marijuana license, one must be a resident of Maine. See ME. STAT.
tit. 28-B, § 202(2) (2018). A resident of Maine is one who files income tax returns in the
state for four years. See id. § 102(48).
134. Michigan imposed a two-year durational residency requirement on retail licenses
that expired on June 30, 2018. See Marihuana — Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing
Act, 2016 MICH. PUB. ACTS 281, § 402.2(g).
135. Oregon imposed a durational residency requirement, but its legislature later
disposed of it. See OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-1115 (2016); Recreational Marijuana, OR.
LIQUOR
CONTROL
COMM’N,
https://www.oregon.gov/olcc/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Y2HV-XY2X] (last visited July 31, 2020) (“[T]here is no residency
requirement.”).
136. See Marijuana FAQs, DEP’T COM., CMTY. & ECON. DEV., ALCOHOL & MARIJUANA
CONTROL OFF., https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/amco/MarijuanaFAQs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZL92-DP43] (last visited July 31, 2020). To establish residency in
Alaska an individual must take “at least one step beyond physical presence” — for
example, registering to vote — before the start of the qualifying year, and “demonstrate[]
intent to remain indefinitely in Alaska.” Establishing Residency, ALASKA DEP’T REVENUE,
PERMANENT FUND DIV., https://pfd.alaska.gov/Eligibility/Establishing-Residency
[https://perma.cc/4K2E-BWMX] (last visited July 31, 2020). The state considers a
number of factors when evaluating an individual’s intent. See id. This cumbersome process
could function as a de facto durational residency requirement. See generally id.; ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.015 (2019).
137. The Illinois legislature has authorized 75 conditional retail marijuana licenses to
be issued after January 2020. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/15–25(a) (2019). A point
system will be used to determine which applicants receive the licenses. See id. 705/15–
30(c). Owners who are Illinois residents of at least five years are awarded additional points
over those who are not. See id. 705/15–30(c)(8).
138. Nevada uses a scoring system to award licenses, but unlike in Illinois, residency of
a certain length does not bolster one’s score. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 453D.272 (2019).
Massachusetts imposes a durational residency requirement for certain types of
producer-level licenses but not on retail licenses. See Licensure as a Marijuana
Establishment,
MASS.
CANNABIS
CONTROL
COMM’N
4
(2018),
https://mass-cannabis-control.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Guidance-for-Marijuana
-Establishment-Licensure-Applicants.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JEE-YKEY].
139. Marijuana regulation in Vermont is in its infancy and so it is still possible the state
will impose a durational residency requirement on retail licenses. See Vermont, MARIJUANA
POL’Y
PROJECT
(June
17,
2020),
https://www.mpp.org/states/vermont/
[https://perma.cc/B8DL-KJVU];
S.54,
VT.
GEN.
ASSEMBLY,
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The novelty of legal recreational marijuana explains why states have
varying and evolving regulations.140 There has been little litigation
concerning state regulation of recreational marijuana at the retail level
and no challenges to durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses as of this Note.
II. THE QUESTION: CAN DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
RETAIL MARIJUANA LICENSES PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER?
The legalization of recreational marijuana is a recent trend, and state
regulation of the marijuana industry is an ongoing and evolving
process.141 Mandating the licensure of marijuana retailers is standard
among states that have legalized recreational marijuana.142 Some of these
states include durational residency requirements as part of their
regulation of retail marijuana licenses.143 The constitutionality of such
residency requirements is questionable and has yet to be settled by the
courts.144 However, parallels can be drawn from existing jurisprudence
on durational residency requirements in other contexts to articulate the
arguments for and against durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses.
This Part examines the two potential answers to whether durational
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are constitutional.
Section II.A examines the argument that durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses pass constitutional muster.
Section II.B then examines the argument that such requirements are
constitutionally impermissible under the right to travel line of cases.
Finally, Section II.C discusses how the dormant Commerce Clause could
be used to challenge durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses.

https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2020/S.54
[https://perma.cc/HF6X-VKMJ]
(last visited July 31, 2020). The legislature is still developing a bill to regulate marijuana
sales at the retail level. See generally id.
140. See Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We
Learned Anything at All?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 221, 225 (2019).
141. See, e.g., id.
142. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.302
(2019).
143. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
144. See Cannabis Residency Restrictions: Are They Unconstitutional?, CANNA L. BLOG
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.cannalawblog.com/cannabis-residency-restrictions-are-they-unconstitution
al/ [https://perma.cc/E2V5-SX5H].
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A. The State View: Durational Residency Requirements for Retail
Marijuana Licenses Are Permissible
States will argue to defend their durational residency requirements.145
The arguments states put forth to defend durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses will mirror the arguments put
forth to defend durational residency requirements in other contexts.
Although the right to travel is a fundamental right,146 state law or
regulation can impinge on it and still pass constitutional muster,
depending on the context.147 When a law or regulation impinges on the
right to travel, courts will apply strict scrutiny to determine if the law or
regulation is constitutionally permissible.148 For such a law or regulation
to survive review, the state must show that it is necessary to promote a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to do so.149
States justify durational residency requirements as necessary to
promote their interest in complying with federal enforcement priorities.150
To survive strict scrutiny, this is not enough, however, because states
must show durational residency requirements are narrowly tailored151 to
complying with federal enforcement priorities.152 To determine whether
this is the case, it is necessary to understand what those priorities are.
In response to Colorado’s and Washington’s unprecedented
legalization of marijuana, then-Deputy Attorney General James Cole

145. States also argue to defend the durational residency requirements of other states
through amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Anderson v. Roe, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998) (No.
98-97), aff’d sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97); Brief of Appellee,
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (No. 73-762).
146. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); see also supra notes 21, 32 and
accompanying text.
147. For example, durational residency requirements for divorce and college tuition
have survived constitutional challenges. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238
(D. Minn. 1970) (upholding a durational residency requirement for in-state tuition); see
supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
149. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504; Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
150. See ALLIE HOWELL, REASON FOUND., RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
MARIJUANA LICENSURE 1 (2019); Kristen Wyatt, Pot States Take Fresh Look at
Out-of-State Investment, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016, 3:11 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/pot-states-take-fresh-look-at-out-of-state-invest
ment-2/ [https://perma.cc/2LA3-KF2N].
151. “Narrowly tailored” requires “a sufficient nexus between the stated government
interest and the classification created by the regulation or its implementation.” Zachary
Ford, Reefer Madness: The Constitutional Consequence of the Federal Government’s
Inconsistent Marijuana Policy, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 671, 689 (2019) (quoting Nunez by
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997)).
152. See Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
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issued a memorandum that laid out what the federal government’s
enforcement priorities would be concerning marijuana.153 These priorities
include “[p]reventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is
legal under state law in some form to other states” and “[p]reventing
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises,
gangs, and cartels.”154
In the words of one U.S. Attorney, marijuana diversion is a
“formidable” problem.155 States that have not legalized marijuana
complain that legalization in nearby states forces redirection of their
police resources to marijuana enforcement.156 The Cole Memo makes clear
that the federal government will enforce the CSA if states fail to prevent
diversion of their legal marijuana into states where it is illegal.157
Durational residency requirements allow a state to ensure a prospective
retailer is a bona fide resident of the state and not merely pretending to
be while actually intending to divert marijuana to other states.158
The Cole Memo also threatens federal enforcement of the CSA in states
where recreational marijuana is legal if the states fail to prevent
marijuana revenue from going to criminals.159 Prior to legalization,
criminal organizations selling on the black market were the only sources
of marijuana.160 The legalized market has the potential to be abused by
criminal organizations.161 For example, a cartel could use a frontman to
set up a retail marijuana business in the legalized market to benefit its
criminal organization. To prevent this, states need durational residency

153. See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James Cole, U.S. Dep’t of Just., to All
U.S.
Attorneys
1
(Aug.
29,
2013)
[hereinafter
Cole
Memo],
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/54MJ-GYVW].
154. Id.
155. Gillian Flaccus, US Prosecutor: Oregon Has Big Pot Overproduction Problem,
TIMES
(Feb.
2,
2018,
1:29
PM),
SEATTLE
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/oregons-top-prosecutor-convenes-marijuana-sum
mit/ [https://perma.cc/B2EE-G3FZ].
156. See Trevor Hughes, Colorado Sued by Neighboring States over Legal Pot, USA TODAY
(Dec.
18,
2014,
5:12
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/18/colorado-marijuana-lawsuit/20
599831/ [https://perma.cc/EW65-99EZ].
157. See Rebecca Sweeney, Unrealistic Expectations: The Federal Government’s
Unachievable Mandate for State Cannabis Regulation, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2175, 2184 (2018);
see also Cole Memo, supra note 153, at 1.
158. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; see, e.g., BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at
33.
159. See Cole Memo, supra note 153, at 1.
160. Legalization makes it difficult for criminal elements to compete with the legal,
regulated market. See Kamin, supra note 140, at 242.
161. See id. at 242–43.
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requirements to “ensure that only law-abiding and responsible applicants
receive licenses.”162
Following the Cole Memo, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN)163 issued its own guidance,164 which is still in effect.165 The
FinCEN guidance listed several “red flags” for financial institutions to be
aware of that “indicate a marijuana-related business may be engaged in
activity that implicates one of the Cole Memo priorities or violates state
law.”166 Financial institutions are tasked with filing a Suspicious Activity
Report (SAR)167 after encountering activity deemed to be a red flag.168
Two of these “red flags” are particularly relevant to durational residency
requirements.
The first red flag is if “[t]he owner(s) or manager(s) of a
marijuana-related business reside outside the state in which the business
is located.”169 Durational residency requirements require a prospective
marijuana retailer to be a resident of the state for a specified period.170

162. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2475 (2019); see
also Wyatt, supra note 150 (describing residency requirements “as a safeguard against
investment by foreign drug cartels”).
163. “FinCEN is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,” whose mission is
to use financial intelligence to “safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat
money laundering and promote national security.” What We Do, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
FIN.
CRIMES
ENF’T
NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/RKT8-7TST] (last visited July 31, 2020).
164. See DEP’T TREASURY FIN., FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-G001,
GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES
(2014)
[hereinafter
GUIDANCE
FOR
BSA
EXPECTATIONS],
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-G001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KNC5-SBJZ] (clarifying Bank Secrecy Act expectations for financial
institutions that serve marijuana-related businesses).
165. See Norman M. Vigil, XV. The States Act: A Response to the Rescission of the Cole
Memo, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 196, 204 (2018) (highlighting that the reporting process
set forth in the FinCEN guidance is still in effect despite then-Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions’s new guidance). Although then-Attorney General Sessions repealed all guidance
the Obama Administration set forth, the justifications stemming from such guidance are
still advanced by states. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, U.S.
Dep’t
of
Just.,
to
All
U.S.
Attorneys
1
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download
[https://perma.cc/VG9D-VBEF]; HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1.
166. GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS, supra note 164, at 5.
167. A financial institution is required to file a SAR if it “knows, suspects, or has reason
to suspect that a transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the financial
institution” involves illegal activity. Id. at 3. SARs are mandated by the Bank Secrecy
Act and must be filed by financial institutions providing services to marijuana-related
businesses because marijuana is illegal on the federal level. See id. (“The obligation to file
a SAR is unaffected by any state law that legalizes marijuana-related activity.”).
168. See id. at 4–5.
169. Id. at 7.
170. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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Such a requirement clearly prevents out-of-state involvement with retail
marijuana licenses — which are “marijuana-related businesses” —
thereby preventing this red flag from ever occurring.
The second red flag avoided by durational residency requirements
occurs when “[a] marijuana-related business engages in international or
interstate activity.”171 The FinCEN guidance explains that this type of
activity can be evidenced by a marijuana-related business’s receipt of
“cash deposits from locations outside the state in which the business
operates.”172 Virtually any transaction with “persons or entities” outside
the state where the marijuana business is located is evidence of
“international or interstate activity” for purposes of the FinCEN
guidance.173
By imposing durational residency requirements on
marijuana retailers, states can avoid this red flag by ensuring that they
only license bona fide residents who will have no reason to conduct
out-of-state transactions.
In addition to avoiding federal enforcement of the CSA, states may
justify durational residency requirements as a way to promote the state’s
interest in avoiding “the land rush phenomenon [seen] in other
jurisdictions” that have legalized recreational marijuana.174 States do not
want people moving into their territory for the sole purpose of opening a
marijuana retail store, and imposing a durational residency requirement
on retail marijuana licenses prevents outsiders from doing just that.175
Similarly, states have an interest in preventing outsiders from free
riding off the work of their citizens.176 The state legalization of marijuana
is largely a result of citizen-initiated ballot measures within those

171. GUIDANCE FOR BSA EXPECTATIONS, supra note 164, at 6.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Kym Kemp, Trinity Supes Pass Marijuana Ordinance; One Year Residency,
BLACKBELT
(Sept.
1,
2016),
500
Permit
Cap,
REDHEADED
http://kymkemp.com/2016/09/01/trinity-supes-pass-marijuana-ordinance-one-year-reside
ncy-500-permit-cap/ [https://perma.cc/R8NY-23VW].
175. See e.g., BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33; see also Kemp, supra note 174
(describing a durational residency requirement imposed by a county’s Board of
Supervisors to protect its local communities as it does not “want to see a lot of outsiders
pouring in”).
176. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 3 (“[T]here is a fear that out-of-state business will
swoop in and take advantage of voters’ hard work in passing legalization.”); see also
BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33.
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states,177 which require a significant effort by the state’s citizens.178 The
citizens who mobilized to change their state’s policy should be the first to
benefit from their success,179 and states want to protect the “great
financial and personal risk” their citizens take to enter the “nascent”
marijuana industry.180 Imposing a durational residency requirement
allows states to do so.
B. The Opposing View: Durational Residency Requirements for Retail
Marijuana Licenses Are Unconstitutional
The constitutionality of durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses could be challenged under the right to travel line of
cases.181 The right to travel line of cases applies strict scrutiny to state
action that impinges on the fundamental right to travel.182 Courts have
struck down durational residency requirements in other contexts when
states could not meet the strict scrutiny standard.183 Challengers of
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses could
mirror the arguments put forth by successful challengers of durational
residency requirements in other contexts, and argue that such
requirements for marijuana licenses cannot stand under this line of cases.
First, critics argue that the state interests durational residency
requirements promote are not compelling enough to satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard.184 According to the states, durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses serve a number of interests.185

177. Amber Phillips, How Illinois Became the First State Legislature to Legalize
POST
(June
14,
2019,
10:09
AM),
Marijuana
Sales,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/04/how-illinois-became-first-state-legi
slature-legalize-marijuana-sales/ [https://perma.cc/LNY6-D4C6] (“Ten states have
legalized recreational marijuana use, most through ballot initiatives.”).
178. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAWMAKING 7–9 (2d ed.
2014) (describing the differing requirements for ballot initiatives among the states). For a
discussion of how residency requirements impact one part of the petition process, see Ryan
A. Partelow, Decoding the “Sphinx-Like Silence”: State Residency, Petition Circulation, and
the First Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2553, 2558–60 (2018).
179. See, e.g., Borchardt, supra note 1; Overton, supra note 4.
180. See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.563 (2019).
181. It may be possible to challenge durational residency requirements on other
grounds, but such grounds are beyond the scope of this Note.
182. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999); Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U.S. 330,
344–45 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
184. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 21–28, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (No.
73-762).
185. See supra Section II.A.
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Showing that these interests are not compelling would induce courts to
strike them down as unconstitutional.186
States justify durational residency requirements for retail marijuana
licenses as being necessary to promote the states’ interests in preventing
an influx of prospective marijuana retailers from out of state,187
preventing nonresidents from free riding,188 and avoiding federal
enforcement of the CSA.189 Preventing an influx of people from out of
state and preventing free riding are not compelling interests.190
States have imposed durational residency requirements for voting as a
means to discourage migrants from settling in the state.191 When a state
wanted to encourage newcomers, it would shorten the time required to
satisfy the durational residency requirement for voting.192 When a state
wanted to curb migration, it would lengthen the durational residency
requirement.193 The Supreme Court effectively eliminated this practice
through a series of decisions,194 and in Shapiro, it held that “deterrence of
indigents from migrating to the State” is a constitutionally impermissible
interest.195 Similarly, a state’s interest in preventing an influx of retail
marijuana license-seeking migrants is not an interest compelling enough
to justify imposing a durational residency requirement.
Preventing free riding is a form of economic protectionism,196 an
interest the Supreme Court has repeatedly held as uncompelling.197 The

186. The Supreme Court struck down the statutes at issue in Shapiro for this reason.
See Shapiro 394 U.S. at 633–38.
187. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
190. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469 (2019)
(explaining that protectionism is not a legitimate state interest).
191. See Mazo, supra note 14, at 626. By the 1940s, every state imposed a type of
durational residency requirement on its voters, and millions of people were prevented from
voting as a consequence of these requirements. See Edward T. Hand, Durational Residence
Requirements for Candidates, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 364 (1973); Mazo, supra note 14, at
632 (“All states had some kind of durational residency qualifications that they maintained
by the 1930s and 1940s.”).
192. See Mazo, supra note 14, at 626.
193. See id. at 626–27.
194. See id. at 645.
195. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
196. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 3–4.
197. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469
(2019) (stressing that economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest); Granholm
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute . . . discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”).
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Shapiro Court held that prioritizing the allocation of “welfare benefits to
those regarded as contributing to the State” is an impermissible state
interest.198 Likewise, prioritizing the allocation of the benefits of retail
marijuana licenses to residents who live in-state long enough to contribute
to legalization is impermissible.
On the other hand, complying with federal enforcement priorities and
avoiding enforcement of the CSA is likely a compelling state interest.199
The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and laws made in
pursuance thereof are “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”200 This gives rise to the preemption doctrine whereby
federal law trumps conflicting state law.201 There is a balance between
federal and state power, which states generally have an interest in
maintaining by avoiding preemption by the federal government.202
Furthermore, the public is likely in accordance with the notion that states
have an interest in avoiding conflict with the federal government, and
“[c]ontroversy seldom erupts when a consensus exists about the
supervening importance of a governmental interest.”203
Assuming, arguendo, that the state interests promoted by durational
residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are compelling, the
relationship between the interests and the requirements can still be
challenged.204 To pass strict scrutiny, the requirements must be narrowly
tailored to promote the interest.205 Critics challenge durational residency

198. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633.
199. The Supreme Court often fails to explain why a particular interest is compelling or
not. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988).
200. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
201. Maria Marulanda, Preemption, Patchwork Immigration Laws, and the Potential for
Brown Sundown Towns, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 321, 335 (2010).
202. “[P]owers ebb and flow” so much so that the Supreme Court — in an effort to
maintain the balance of power between the states and federal government — now
recognizes that the states have certain rights as a result of being states. See Timothy Zick,
Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM &
MARY L. REV. 213, 226 (2004) (criticizing the notion of state rights as being incompatible
with the founders’ intended system of federalism); see also Marulanda, supra note 201, at
335.
203. Fallon, supra note 25, at 1322.
204. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
205. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999); see also Donahue, supra note 18,
at 456.
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requirements by arguing they are not narrowly tailored to promote state
interests, even if such interests are compelling.206
Durational residency requirements can be said not to be narrowly
tailored to the state interests they purportedly serve because they fail to
fulfill their purpose.207 For instance, preventing marijuana diversion is a
high priority for states,208 but durational residency requirements fail to
prevent diversion.209
Finally, the benefit of having a state-issued retail marijuana license is
not portable, and so durational residency requirements are inappropriate.
Unlike an education or a divorce, one cannot enter a state, receive the
benefit of a retail marijuana license, then take the benefit away to another
state. The benefits of a retail marijuana license are more akin to welfare
benefits — they cannot be enjoyed outside the state they are received.210
C. Another Question: Can Durational Residency Requirements for Retail
Marijuana Licenses Be Challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine?
State laws and regulations can be challenged under the dormant
Commerce Clause if they interfere with interstate commerce.211 But the
existence of an interstate market for marijuana was questionable until the
Supreme Court examined the issue in Gonzales v. Raich.212
Raich involved the federal seizure of an individual’s marijuana plants
that were possessed legally under California’s medical marijuana laws.213
At issue was the conflict between the federal prohibition of the
manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana214 and

206. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at *34–35, Anderson v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 31 (1998)
(No. 98-97), 1998 WL 847469, sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97);
Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
207. See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2475–
76 (2019). In striking down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement for retail liquor
licenses, the Court declared that “[t]he 2-year residency requirement . . . poorly serves the
goal of enabling the State to ensure that only law-abiding and responsible applicants
receive licenses.” Id.
208. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; Wyatt, supra note 150.
209. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 11 (“[I]t is not clear that the [durational residency]
requirements reduce marijuana diversion . . . .”).
210. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
211. Carey, supra note 95, at 139–40.
212. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
213. Id. at 7.
214. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018).
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California’s Compassionate Use Act.215
Raich challenged the
constitutionality of the CSA, but the Court upheld the statute.216 The
Court held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate the
intrastate possession of marijuana despite it being a “purely local”
activity because it has “a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”217
There is “an established, albeit illegal, interstate market” for marijuana,
which puts the regulation thereof under Congress’s Commerce Clause
power.218
The courts use the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to ensure states
do not inhibit interstate commerce in areas that Congress has left to the
states to regulate.219 In certain areas, Congress invokes its commerce
authority but leaves “substantial room . . . for state regulation” in the
area.220 Regarding marijuana, Congress has exercised its commerce power
to regulate via the CSA221 but has left no room for state regulation.222
However, states continue to contravene the CSA by legalizing medical
and recreational marijuana.223
States’ continued contravention of federal law has led to a number of
constitutional questions.224 Whether the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine can be used to challenge durational residency requirements for

215. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–7. The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 gave California
residents the right to use marijuana for medical purposes upon a physician’s
recommendation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2017).
216. See generally Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–9.
217. Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44. “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity
that is not itself ‘commercial,’ . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
218. See id. at 18–19 (“[T]he regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption . . . has a substantial
effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”).
219. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
220. Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570.
221. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
222. The CSA provides for the complete prohibition of marijuana and so the Supreme
Court’s approval should have ended the debate concerning state and federal power to
regulate marijuana. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421, 1422–23
(2009).
223. See Ford, supra note 151, at 676. “Raich did not stop (or even slow) state
legalization campaigns.” Mikos, supra note 222, at 1423.
224. These questions concern equal protection for noncitizens, federalism, preemption,
and property rights, among others. See generally Ford, supra note 151; Sprankling, supra
note 125.

2020]

LICENSE TO SELL

1467

marijuana licenses is among them.225 Federal legislation that legalizes
marijuana would simplify the answer.226
If marijuana is legalized on the federal level,227 durational residency
requirements for retail licenses will undoubtedly be open to dormant
Commerce Clause challenges.228 Such requirements are similar to those
for retail liquor licenses,229 which have been challenged and invalidated
on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.230
A law or regulation that is discriminatory on its face is presumed by
the courts to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.231 Because
durational residency requirements create two classes of individuals —
residents and nonresidents — they are discriminatory on their face.232 As

225. For an argument that recreational marijuana does not fall under Congress’s
commerce power despite Raich, see Cooper, supra note 12, at 202.
226. Polls show that U.S. support for the legalization of marijuana has risen steadily
since 1979, and currently support is at 65%. Jennifer De Pinto, Support for Marijuana
Legalization Hits New High, CBS News Poll Finds, CBS NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019, 10:25 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/support-for-marijuana-legalization-hits-new-high-cbs-ne
ws-poll-finds/ [https://perma.cc/AY5U-KTSG]. The debate concerning federal
legalization’s merits is outside the scope of this Note.
227. What exactly federal legalization would entail is debatable. See JONATHAN P.
CAULKINS ET AL., RAND CORP., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR
VERMONT
AND
OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
50
(2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.html
[https://perma.cc/64QA-BNPS] (describing 12 alternative ways to regulate marijuana).
Establishing a three-tier system to regulate recreational marijuana is widely supported,
especially by the alcohol industry. See Spencer Bokat-Lindell, What’s the Right Way to
Legalize
Weed?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
19,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/opinion/weed-legalization-biden.html
[https://perma.cc/9DSF-YPCR]; see, e.g., Thomas Pellechia, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers
of America Group Supports Legalized Cannabis, FORBES (July 27, 2018, 10:21 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomaspellechia/2018/07/27/the-u-s-trade-group-representi
ng-80-of-alcohol-sales-supports-legalized-cannabis/#1a19aa6d74c2
[https://perma.cc/UA7F-SGR2]. Regardless of the end result, the first step must be
removing marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA, and the House Judiciary Committee
recently approved a bill that does just that. See Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., House Committee
Approves Landmark Bill Legalizing Marijuana at the Federal Level, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2019,
6:18
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/20/house-committee-approves-bill-decriminalizing-marij
uana-on-the-federal-level.html [https://perma.cc/E9DZ-H8RK].
228. Federal legalization would allow for an interstate marijuana market in the
traditional sense. See Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44.
229. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23961(c) (West 2019), GA. CODE ANN. §
3-4-23(a) (2019), and IND. CODE § 7.1-3-21-3 (2019), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
69.50.331(1)(b)(ii) (2019), OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-1115 (2016), and CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 26054.1 (Deering 2016) (repealed 2017).
230. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461 (2019).
231. Carey, supra note 95, at 140 (“[W]here a statute discriminates against interstate
commerce, the law is ‘virtually per se invalid.’”).
232. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474.
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such, they are presumptively invalid and will be struck down unless the
state can show they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.233
However, the Supreme Court makes clear that durational residency
requirements for retail licenses that are discriminatory on their face
cannot be sustained for any purpose.234
States could argue that marijuana is a unique commodity — similar to
alcohol — and so they should have more power to regulate it.235 This is
unlikely to stand, however, the Court did not find states were granted
such broad power to regulate alcohol, despite the Twenty-First
Amendment.236 There is no constitutional amendment that grants states
the power to regulate marijuana, and so the argument is much weaker.
III. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR RETAIL MARIJUANA
LICENSES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
Durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses are
unconstitutional under the right to travel line of cases. Furthermore,
there is a strong case against such requirements under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Therefore, states with durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses should repeal them, and states
that legalize recreational marijuana in the future — or have yet to
promulgate regulations — should not include such requirements.
This Part argues that durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses are unconstitutional under the right to travel line of
cases and the dormant Commerce Clause. First, Section III.A argues
why, if challenged today, these requirements should be held to be an
unconstitutional impingement on the right to travel. Next, Section III.B
argues that these requirements are also unconstitutional under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Finally, Section III.C examines
alternatives to durational residency requirements for retail licenses
available to states.

233. See id. at 2461.
234. The Court struck down durational residency requirements for retail liquor licenses
after balancing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the Twenty-First
Amendment. See generally Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449. In doing so, the Court declared
that “[s]ince the 2-year residency requirement discriminates on its face against
nonresidents, it could not be sustained if it applied across the board to all those seeking to
operate any retail business in the State.” Id. at 2474.
235. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text.
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A. The Right to Travel and Sell Marijuana
Durational residency requirements have been struck down in a variety
of contexts for unconstitutionally interfering with the fundamental right
to travel that U.S. citizens enjoy.237 Courts have yet to examine
durational residency requirements in the retail marijuana context but will
likely be compelled to strike them down. Therefore, states should not
impose durational residency requirements on retail marijuana licenses.
The right to travel is a fundamental right that courts protect by
applying strict scrutiny to state action that interferes with it.238 To
survive a constitutional challenge under the right to travel line of cases, a
durational residency requirement must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.239 That the requirement promotes a compelling
state interest cannot be satisfied in the retail marijuana license context.
There are a number of different “compelling” interests the states claim
are promoted by durational residency requirements for retail marijuana
licenses.240 First, states claim their interest in preventing an influx of
people who move to the state solely to seek a retail marijuana license is a
compelling interest that durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses promote.241 However, the Supreme Court has held
that curbing migration is not a compelling state interest that can justify
durational residency requirements.242
Second, states claim they have an interest in preventing noncitizens
from free riding off the work of their citizens.243 However, this is a form
of economic protectionism, which is constitutionally impermissible.244
The final interest put forth by the states is their interest in
complying with federal enforcement priorities.245 This is the most likely
interest to be compelling in the eyes of the courts.246 Even so, states
cannot show that durational residency requirements for retail marijuana
licenses are narrowly tailored to complying with federal enforcement
priorities.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
3–4.
245.
246.

See Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999); see also Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504; see also Donahue, supra note 18, at 456.
See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); HOWELL, supra note 150, at
See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1; Wyatt, supra note 150.
See supra notes 199–225 and accompanying text.
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To be narrowly tailored, there must be a sufficient connection between
complying with federal enforcement priorities and durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses.247 To survive strict scrutiny,
durational residency requirements must “fit the compelling goal so closely
that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate.”248 Durational residency requirements for retail
marijuana licenses fail to achieve compliance with federal enforcement
priorities, so they do not “fit the compelling goal” whatsoever.249
For example, preventing marijuana diversion is a high priority for
states,250 and durational residency requirements for retail licenses
arguably allow a state to ensure licenses are only granted to bona fide
residents who will not facilitate diversion.251 However, durational
residency requirements fail to prevent diversion.252 A Nebraska town —
where recreational marijuana is illegal — that borders Colorado — where
recreational marijuana is legal — has seen marijuana-related arrests
increase 400% in three years.253 The issue escalated to a point where two
states sued the neighboring state that legalized recreational marijuana
because of marijuana diversion into their territory.254 Evidently, states
are failing to comply with the Cole Memo priority of preventing diversion,
despite imposing durational residency requirements for retail licenses.255

247. See Ford, supra note 151, at 689.
248. See id. at 689–90 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
249. Federal enforcement priorities include preventing diversion and preventing
marijuana revenue from going to criminal elements. See supra notes 154–58 and
accompanying text. However, durational residency requirements have failed to do so. See
Dennis Romero et al., Foreign Cartels Embrace Home-Grown Marijuana in Pot-Legal States,
NBC
NEWS
(May
29,
2018,
8:28
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/foreign-cartels-embrace-home-grown-marijuan
a-pot-legal-states-n875666 [https://perma.cc/BN3J-NTG8] (“[L]egal recreational
marijuana states . . . have been providing cover for transnational criminal
organizations . . . .”).
250. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; Wyatt, supra note 150.
251. See BROHL & FINLAW, supra note 7, at 33; HOWELL, supra note 150, at 1–2; see also
supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
252. See HOWELL, supra note 150, at 11 (“[I]t is not clear that the [durational residency]
requirements reduce marijuana diversion . . . .”).
253. Hughes, supra note 156.
254. However, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. See Richard Wolf & Trevor
Hughes, Justice Won’t Hear Nebraska, Oklahoma Marijuana Dispute with Colorado, USA
TODAY
(Mar.
21,
2016,
12:58
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/21/marijuana-lawsuit-colorado-oklahoma
-nebraska-supreme-court/81984006/ [https://perma.cc/N7QW-MJRD].
255. “Diversion continues to be a problem . . . .” Sweeney, supra note 157, at 2203; see
also Thomas Fuller, ‘Getting Worse, Not Better’: Illegal Pot Market Booming in California
TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2019),
Despite
Legalization,
N.Y.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court looks at the “portability” of the
government benefit when analyzing the validity of a durational residency
requirement that restricts receipt of that benefit.256 When a government
benefit can be received from one state then taken and enjoyed in another,
a durational residency requirement may be permissible.257 However, if
the benefit cannot be transferred to another state, “there is no danger
that . . . citizens of other States . . . establish residency for just long
enough to acquire . . . [the] benefit” and then leave to enjoy it in their
original state.258 This distinction allowed the Court to strike down
California’s durational residency requirement for welfare benefits after
upholding Iowa’s durational residency requirement for seeking a
divorce.259 A retail license is valid only in the state where it is granted,
and so retail marijuana licenses, like welfare benefits, are a benefit that
cannot be received from one state and subsequently taken to another.260
B. The Illegal Interstate Market: Retail Marijuana Licenses and the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tennessee Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas261 makes clear that the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is alive and well.262 The dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is used to prevent states from restricting interstate commerce.263
The purpose of the doctrine is to “preserve[] a national market for goods
and services.”264 However, the CSA makes distributing marijuana illegal
at the federal level,265 which prevents the marijuana market from being
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/marijuana-california-legalization.html
[https://perma.cc/SYU7-263U]; Andrew Selsky, Legal Marijuana States Seek to Crack
Down
Illegal
Smuggling,
INC.
(Aug.
14,
2017),
https://www.inc.com/associated-press/legal-marijuana-pot-states-crack-down-on-smuggli
ng.html [https://perma.cc/N9HL-BQWL].
256. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Compare id., with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975); see also Conlan, supra
note 30, at 1406.
260. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.331 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-B, §
202 (2018).
261. 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
262. See id. at 2469 (rejecting the view that the Twenty-First Amendment shields state
alcohol regulation from application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
263. Redish & Nugent, supra note 91, at 570.
264. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273 (1988)).
265. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance . . . .”). Marijuana is a controlled
substance. Id. § 812(c)(10).

1472

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

“interstate” in the traditional sense.266 Notwithstanding the fact that it
is illegal to move marijuana across state lines, the Supreme Court has held
that there is an interstate market for marijuana.267
This is a borderline legal fiction in that no market exists whereby
marijuana can be legitimately transferred from one state to another.268
Despite any uneasiness that one might experience accepting a
counterintuitive fact as true merely because the Court says it is so, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”269 Therefore, there is an interstate market for marijuana
as per the Court’s holding in Raich.270 However, to say state regulation
of retail marijuana licenses interferes with interstate commerce even
though there is no traditional interstate market is nonsensical, so a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge might fail to win the courts. If
marijuana is legalized on the federal level, then this type of challenge
would be more convincing.
The growing trend of legalization by the states and the popularity of
legalization among the populace make federal legalization not as
farfetched an idea as it first might seem.271 Such an event would clearly
thrust marijuana into the interstate market and thereby subject
durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses to
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.272

266. Sprankling, supra note 125, at 44.
267. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (“[T]here is an established, albeit illegal,
interstate market.”).
268. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 844 (2018).
269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
270. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
271. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuana.
Legal Recreational Marijuana States and DC, supra note 6. The first retail recreational
marijuana sales in Michigan occurred on December 1, 2019, and the five locations across
the state sold $1.6 million of marijuana in eight days. See Kathleen Gray, Recreational
Marijuana Sales in Michigan Exceed $1.6 Million in First 8 Days, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Dec.
9,
2019,
5:22
PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/marijuana/2019/12/09/recreational-marijuana-sales-m
ichigan-exceed-1-6-million-first-week/2634432001/
[https://perma.cc/M433-HK5W].
Despite these statistics, legalization of recreational marijuana is not without opposition.
See, e.g., Samuel T. Wilkinson, More Reasons States Should Not Legalize Marijuana:
Medical and Recreational Marijuana: Commentary and Review of the Literature, 110 MO.
MED. 524, 524 (2013); German Lopez, A New Study Found Marijuana Legalization Leads
to
More
Problematic
Use,
VOX
(Nov.
13,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/11/13/20962924/marijuana-legalization-us
e-addiction-study [https://perma.cc/S225-XPVN]. Again, the merits of the arguments for
and against legalization are outside the scope of this Note.
272. Given the Court’s holding in Raich that there is an interstate market for medical
marijuana, it may be possible to challenge durational residency requirements for
recreational retail marijuana licenses under the dormant Commerce Clause, although there
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Durational residency requirements for retail marijuana licenses will not
survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Such requirements are
discriminatory on their face because they create two classes which favor
residents over nonresidents.273 When this is the case, it is presumed that
the discriminatory statute is invalid,274 and courts will strike it down.275
C. Alternatives to Durational Residency Requirements
There are alternative ways states can regulate retail marijuana sales
that do not discriminate against nonresidents. The abundance of alcohol
jurisprudence provides examples of how states can do so. The fact that
nondiscriminatory alternatives exist may also push courts to strike down
durational residency requirements.276
State law may allow local governments to cap the number of retail
liquor licenses issued within their jurisdiction, and states may also cap the
amount of alcohol retailers can sell to an individual purchaser.277 States
are also empowered to mandate high levels of training for retailers and
“could even demand that they demonstrate an adequate connection with
and knowledge of the local community.”278 The Supreme Court found
that these powers — without durational residency requirements — are
enough for the states to promote any compelling interest they might have
in regulating alcohol.279
The same alternatives to durational residency requirements for retail
liquor licenses can be used to regulate marijuana in a way that does not
discriminate against nonresidents while still promoting any compelling

is no interstate market in the traditional sense. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18, 22 (“That the
regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.”).
273. Similar to Tennessee’s durational residency requirement that the Court
invalidated in Tennessee Wine. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139
S. Ct. 2449, 2474 (2019) (“Tennessee’s 2-year durational-residency requirement plainly
favors Tennesseans over nonresidents.”); see also Carey, supra note 95, at 140 (“[W]here a
statute discriminates against interstate commerce, the law is ‘virtually per se invalid.’”).
274. Carey, supra note 95, at 141.
275. “Since the 2-year residency requirement discriminates on its face against
nonresidents, it could not be sustained if it applied across the board to all those seeking to
operate any retail business in the State.” Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474.
276. See id. at 2476 (discussing nondiscriminatory alternatives to the durational
residency requirement for retail liquor licenses at issue).
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See id. (“Not only is the 2-year residency requirement ill suited to promote
responsible sales and consumption practices (an interest that we recognize as
legitimate . . . ), but there are obvious alternatives that better serve that goal without
discriminating against nonresidents.”). The Court went on to hold that given all the
possible alternatives, the durational residency requirement could not be valid. See id.
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interests the state has in regulating marijuana. Some states such as
California allow local governments to limit the number of retail marijuana
licenses issued within their jurisdiction,280 and some state governments
impose a limit themselves.281 There is no compelling interest that a
durational residency requirement for retail marijuana licenses promotes
that alternative, nondiscriminatory means cannot promote.282 As Justice
Samuel Alito bluntly explained, a “State can thoroughly investigate
applicants without requiring them to reside in the State,” making
durational residency requirements for retail licenses unnecessary.283
CONCLUSION
States have started to legalize recreational marijuana despite the
continuing federal prohibition. Jurisprudence on durational residency
requirements for retail marijuana licenses is lacking, but as more states
begin to legalize and regulate recreational marijuana, courts will have to
confront the question of their constitutionality.
Although durational residency requirements on retail licenses are a
popular restriction the states impose, such requirements are an
unconstitutional impingement on the right to travel. These requirements
will also be held unconstitutional if subject to challenge under the
dormant Commerce Clause. States have alternative ways to regulate their
nascent marijuana industries and should not impose durational residency
requirements on retail marijuana licenses.

280. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26201 (Deering 2016) (“A local jurisdiction may
establish additional standards, requirements, and regulations.”).
281. See e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/15–25(a) (2019) (authorizing the issuance of 75
retail marijuana licenses).
282. See supra Section III.A.
283. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2475. “As the Fifth Circuit observed in a similar case,
‘[i]f [the State] desires to scrutinize its applicants thoroughly, as is its right, it can devise
nondiscriminatory means short of saddling applicants with the ‘burden’ of residing’ in the
State.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir.
1994)).

